Перевод: со всех языков на все языки

со всех языков на все языки

the human mind

Толкование Перевод

1 the human mind

• ihmishenki

English-Finnish dictionary > the human mind
2 the sinuosities of the human mind

Общая лексика: сложный ход человеческой мысли

Универсальный англо-русский словарь > the sinuosities of the human mind
3 the workings of the human mind

Общая лексика: мыслительный процесс

Универсальный англо-русский словарь > the workings of the human mind
4 manas (In Indian philosophy, the human mind, that faculty which coordinates sensory impressions before they are presented to the consciousness)

Религия: манас

Универсальный англо-русский словарь > manas (In Indian philosophy, the human mind, that faculty which coordinates sensory impressions before they are presented to the consciousness)
5 Mind

   1) To Know the Different Operations of the Mind

   It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reﬂection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reﬂection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)

   2) The Mind Is Furnished by Experience

   Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)

   3) Mythical Thought Is as Rigorous as That of Modern Science

   The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)

   4) The Mind Has Nothing But Itself to Know Itself

   MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)

   5) To Know Is to Represent Accurately

   [Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)

   6) The Question of Mind in Relation to Machine

   Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)

   7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive Analyses

   Recent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have ﬂourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....

   Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.

   In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.

   The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)

   8) Approaches to the Study of the Mind

   Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.

... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind
6 mind

1. noun
1) (remembrance)

bear or keep something in mind — an etwas (Akk.) denken; etwas nicht vergessen

have in mind to do something — vorhaben, etwas zu tun

bring something to mind — etwas in Erinnerung rufen

something comes into somebody's mind — jemandem fällt etwas ein

it went out of my mind — ich habe es vergessen; es ist mir entfallen

put something/somebody out of one's mind — etwas/jemanden aus seinem Gedächtnis streichen

2) (opinion)

give somebody a piece of one's mind — jemandem gründlich die Meinung sagen

in or to my mind — meiner Meinung od. Ansicht nach

be of one or of the same mind, be in one mind — einer Meinung sein

be in two minds about something — [sich (Dat.)] unschlüssig über etwas (Akk.) sein

change one's mind — seine Meinung ändern

have a mind of one's own — seinen eigenen Kopf haben

I have a good mind/half a mind to do that — ich hätte große Lust/nicht übel Lust, das zu tun

make up one's mind, make one's mind up — sich entscheiden

make up one's mind to do something — sich entschließen, etwas zu tun

read somebody's mind — jemandes Gedanken lesen

3) (direction of thoughts)

his mind is on other things — er ist mit den Gedanken woanders

give or put or turn one's mind to — sich konzentrieren auf (+ Akk.) [Arbeit, Aufgabe, Angelegenheit]

I have had somebody/something on my mind — jemand/etwas hat mich beschäftigt; (worried) ich habe mir Sorgen wegen jemandem/etwas gemacht

she has a lot of things on her mind — sie hat viele Sorgen

something preys or weighs on somebody's mind — etwas macht jemandem zu schaffen

take somebody's mind off something — jemanden von etwas ablenken

keep one's mind on something — sich auf etwas (Akk.) konzentrieren

close one's mind to something — sich einer Sache (Dat.) verschließen (geh.)

4) (way of thinking and feeling) Denkweise, die

frame of mind — [seelische] Verfassung

state of mind — [Geistes]zustand, der

be in a frame of mind to do something — in der Verfassung sein, etwas zu tun

have a logical mind — logisch denken

5) (seat of consciousness, thought, volition) Geist, der

it's all in the mind — es ist alles nur Einstellung

in one's mind — im stillen

in my mind's eye — vor meinem geistigen Auge; im Geiste

nothing could be further from my mind than... — nichts läge mir ferner, als...

6) (intellectual powers) Verstand, der; Intellekt, der

have a very good mind — einen klaren od. scharfen Verstand haben

great minds think alike — (joc.) große Geister denken [eben] gleich

7) (normal mental faculties) Verstand, der

lose or go out of one's mind — den Verstand verlieren

be out of one's mind — den Verstand verloren haben

in one's right mind — bei klarem Verstand
2. transitive verb
1) (heed)

don't mind what he says — gib nichts auf sein Gerede

mind what I say — glaub mir

let's do it, and never mind the expense — machen wir es doch, egal, was es kostet

2) (concern oneself about)

he minds a lot what people think of him — es ist für ihn sehr wichtig, was die Leute von ihm denken

I can't afford a bicycle, never mind a car — ich kann mir kein Fahrrad leisten, geschweige denn ein Auto

never mind him/that — (don't be anxious) er/das kann dir doch egal sein (ugs.)

never mind how/where... — es tut nichts zur Sache, wie/wo...

don't mind me — nimm keine Rücksicht auf mich; (don't let my presence disturb you) lass dich [durch mich] nicht stören; (iron.) nimm bloß keine Rücksicht auf mich

mind the doors! — Vorsicht an den Türen!

mind one's P's and Q's — sich anständig benehmen

3) usu. neg. or interrog. (object to)

did he mind being woken up? — hat es ihm was ausgemacht, aufgeweckt zu werden?

would you mind opening the door? — würdest du bitte die Tür öffnen?

do you mind my smoking? — stört es Sie od. haben Sie etwas dagegen, wenn ich rauche?

I wouldn't mind a walk — ich hätte nichts gegen einen Spaziergang

4) (remember and take care)

mind you don't leave anything behind — denk daran, nichts liegen lassen!

mind how you go! — pass auf! sei vorsichtig!; (as general farewell) mach's gut! (ugs.)

mind you get this work done — sieh zu, dass du mit dieser Arbeit fertig wirst!

5) (have charge of) aufpassen auf (+ Akk.)

mind the shop or (Amer.) the store — (fig.) sich um den Laden kümmern (ugs.)
3. intransitive verb
1)

mind! — Vorsicht!; Achtung!

2) usu. in imper. (take note)

follow the signposts, mind, or... — denk daran und halte dich an die Wegweiser, sonst...

I didn't know that, mind, or... — das habe ich allerdings nicht gewusst, sonst...

3) (care, object)

do you mind? — (may I?) hätten Sie etwas dagegen?; (please do not) ich muss doch sehr bitten

he doesn't mind about your using the car — er hat nichts dagegen, wenn Sie den Wagen benutzen

if you don't mind — wenn es dir recht ist

4) (give heed)

never [you] mind — (it's not important) macht nichts; ist nicht schlimm; (it's none of your business) sei nicht so neugierig

never mind: I can do it — schon gut - das kann ich machen

never mind about that now! — lass das jetzt mal [sein/liegen]!

never mind about him - what happened to her? — er interessiert mich nicht - was ist ihr passiert?

Phrasal Verbs:

- academic.ru/89159/mind_out">mind out

* * *
1.
(the power by which one thinks etc; the intelligence or understanding: The child already has the mind of an adult.) der Verstand
2. verb
1) (to look after or supervise (eg a child): mind the baby.) aufpassen

2) (to be upset by; to object to: You must try not to mind when he criticizes your work.) sich etwas machen aus

3) (to be careful of: Mind (= be careful not to trip over) the step!) sich in Acht nehmen

4) (to pay attention to or obey: You should mind your parents' words/advice.) beachten
3. interjection
(be careful!: Mind! There's a car coming!) Achtung!

- -minded
- mindful
- mindless
- mindlessly
- mindlessness
- mindreader
- at/in the back of one's mind
- change one's mind
- be out of one's mind
- do you mind! - have a good mind to
- have half a mind to
- have a mind to
- in one's mind's eye
- in one's right mind
- keep one's mind on
- know one's own mind
- make up one's mind
- mind one's own business
- never mind
- on one's mind
- put someone in mind of
- put in mind of
- speak one's mind
- take/keep one's mind off
- to my mind
* * *

mind

[maɪnd]

I. n

1. (brain, intellect) Geist m, Verstand m

she's one of the greatest \minds of today sie ist einer der größten Köpfe unserer Zeit

it's a question of \mind over matter das ist eine reine Willensfrage

he's got the \mind of a four-year-old! er hat den Verstand eines Vierjährigen!

it was a triumph of \mind over matter hier war der Wille stärker

in one's \mind eyes vor seinem geistigen Auge

frame of \mind seelische Verfassung

a fine \mind ein großer Geist

to have a good \mind einen klaren Verstand haben

to have a logical \mind logisch denken können

to the Victorian \mind nach der viktorianischen Denkweise

to use one's \mind seinen Verstand gebrauchen

2. (sanity) Verstand m

to be in one's right \mind noch ganz richtig im Kopf sein

to be out of one's \mind den Verstand verloren haben

to drive sb out of his/her \mind jdn wahnsinnig machen

to lose [or go out of] one's \mind den Verstand verlieren

3. (thoughts) Gedanken pl

the idea never entered my \mind auf diesen Gedanken wäre ich gar nicht gekommen

it went out of my \mind ich hab's vergessen

you put that out of your \mind! das kannst du dir aus dem Kopf schlagen!

I can't get that song out of my \mind das Lied will mir einfach nicht mehr aus dem Kopf gehen!

sorry, my \mind is on other things tut mir leid, ich bin mit den Gedanken ganz woanders

to be on one's \mind einen beschäftigen

you're always on my \mind ich denke die ganze Zeit an dich

what's on your \mind? woran denkst du?

what's on your \mind! woran du nur wieder denkst!

to be in the back of sb's \mind in jds Hinterkopf sein

to bear [or keep] sth in \mind etw nicht vergessen

bearing in \mind that... angesichts der Tatsache, dass...

to bring [or call] sth to \mind (remember) sich akk etw in Erinnerung rufen; (remind) an etw akk erinnern

to come [or spring] to sb's \mind jdm einfallen

to have sb/sth in \mind an jdn/etw denken

did you have anything special in \mind? dachten Sie an etwas Bestimmtes?

to have a lot of things on one's \mind viele Sorgen haben

to keep one's \mind on sth one's work sich akk auf etw akk konzentrieren

sth puts sb in \mind of sth esp BRIT etw erinnert jdn an etw akk

to put sb out of one's \mind jdn aus seinem Gedächtnis streichen

to read sb's \mind jds Gedanken lesen

to set one's \mind to do sth sich akk auf etw akk konzentrieren

to take sb's \mind off sth jdn auf andere Gedanken bringen [o von etw dat ablenken

4. (intention)

nothing could be further from my \mind than... nichts läge mir ferner als...

to have in \mind to do sth vorhaben, etw zu tun

to know one's [own] \mind wissen, was man will

to make up one's \mind sich akk entscheiden

my \mind is made up! ich habe einen Entschluss gefasst!

to set one's \mind on sth sich dat etw in den Kopf setzen

5. usu sing (opinion) Meinung f, Ansicht f

to my \mind... meiner Meinung nach...

to give sb a piece of one's \mind jdm seine Meinung sagen

to be of the same \mind der gleichen Meinung [o derselben Ansicht] sein

I'm of the same \mind as you ich bin deiner Meinung

to be in [or of] two \minds about sth sich dat über etw akk nicht im Klaren sein

to change one's \mind es sich dat anders überlegen

to have a \mind of one's own seinen eigenen Kopf haben

6. (inclination)

to have half a [good] \mind to... gute Lust haben,...

to be of a \mind to do sth ( form) geneigt sein, etw zu tun

7.

▶ to be bored out of one's \mind sich akk zu Tode langweilen

▶ great \minds think alike ah, ich sehe, wir verstehen uns!

II. vt

1. (be careful of)

▪ to \mind sth auf etw akk aufpassen

\mind your head [or that you don't bang your head] pass auf, dass du dir nicht den Kopf stößt

\mind your head Vorsicht mit dem Kopf!

here, \mind, he said when she trod on his foot passen Sie doch auf, sagte er, als sie ihm auf den Fuß trat

\mind the step! Vorsicht Stufe!

\mind how you go pass doch auf!; (as farewell) pass auf dich auf!

\mind your language! ( dated) pass auf, was du sagst!

2. (care about)

▪ to \mind sb sich akk um jdn kümmern

don't \mind me kümmer dich nicht um mich

don't \mind what she says kümmer dich nicht darum, was sie sagt

and never \mind the expense und vergiss jetzt einfach mal die Kosten

never \mind them — what about me? was kümmern mich die — was ist mit mir?

never \mind her! vergiss sie doch einfach!

never \mind how you got there... ist doch egal, wie du da hinkamst,...

\mind your own business! kümmer dich um deine eigenen Angelegenheiten!

I don't \mind the heat die Hitze macht mir nichts aus!

I don't \mind what she does es ist mir egal, was sie macht!

3. (make certain)

▪ to \mind that... denk daran, dass...

\mind you close the door when you leave vergiss nicht, die Tür zuzumachen, wenn du gehst

\mind you get this done before she gets home sieh zu, dass du damit fertig wirst, bevor sie nach Hause kommt

4. (look after)

▪ to \mind sb/sth auf jdn/etw aufpassen; ( fig)

I'm \minding the shop ich kümmere mich hier um den Laden

5. ( fam: object)

▪ to not \mind sth nichts gegen etw akk [einzuwenden] haben

would you \mind holding this for me? würden Sie das [kurz] für mich halten?

do you \mind my asking you a question? darf ich Ihnen eine Frage stellen?

do you \mind calling me a taxi? würde es dir was ausmachen, mir ein Taxi zu rufen?

do you \mind my smoking? stört es Sie, wenn ich rauche?

I don't \mind her ich habe nichts gegen sie

I wouldn't \mind a new car/a cup of tea gegen ein neues Auto/eine Tasse Tee hätte ich nichts einzuwenden!

6.

▶ to \mind one's p's and q's sich akk gut benehmen

▶ \mind you allerdings

\mind you, I'd love to have a cup of tea! also, gegen eine Tasse Tee hätte ich jetzt nichts einzuwenden!

\mind you, she did try immerhin hat sie es versucht!

III. vi

1. (care) sich dat etwas daraus machen

I don't \mind das ist mir egal

sometime I wish he \minded a little more manchmal wünsche ich mir, dass es ihm ein bisschen mehr ausmachen würde

never \mind! [ist doch] egal!

never \mind, I'll do it myself! vergiss es, ich mach's selbst!

never \mind, one day... mach dir nichts draus — eines Tages...

never \mind about that mistake vergiss den Fehler einfach!

never \mind about that now vergiss das jetzt mal

never \mind about her — what about you? jetzt vergiss sie doch mal — was ist mit dir?

never you \mind! jetzt kümmer dich mal nicht drum!

2. (object) etwas dagegen haben

do you \mind if I...? stört es Sie, wenn ich...?

do you \mind! (don't!) ich muss doch sehr bitten!; (may I?) darf ich?

nobody will \mind das wird niemanden stören

if you don't \mind... wenn du nichts dagegen hast,...

if you don't \mind me saying so,... ich hoffe, es macht dir nichts aus, dass ich dir das jetzt sage, aber...

I don't \mind if I do ich hätte nichts dagegen

3.

▶ never \mind... geschweige denn...

* * *
[maɪnd]
1. NOUN

1) = intellect Geist m (ALSO PHILOS), Verstand m

things of the mind — Geistiges nt

the conscious and unconscious mind — das Bewusste und das Unbewusste

to have a good mind —

one of the finest minds of our times — einer der großen Geister unserer Zeit

it's all in the mind —

in one's mind's eye — vor seinem geistigen Auge, im Geiste

to blow sb's mind (inf) — jdn umwerfen (inf); (drugs) jdn high machen (inf) → boggle, great, improve

it's a question of mind over matter — es ist eine Willenssache or -frage

a triumph of mind over matter — ein Triumph des Geistes or Willens über den Körper

2) = way of thinking Denkweise f; (= type of mind) Geist m, Kopf m

to the child's/Victorian mind — in der Denkweise des Kindes/der viktorianischen Zeit

he has that kind of mind — er ist so veranlagt

to have a literary/logical etc mind — literarisch/logisch etc veranlagt sein

he has the mind of a five-year old — er verhält sich wie ein Fünfjähriger

in the public mind prostitution is immoral — nach dem Empfinden der Öffentlichkeit ist Prostitution unmoralisch

state or frame of mind — (seelische) Verfassung, (Geistes)zustand m

3) = thoughts Gedanken pl

to be clear in one's mind about sth — sich (dat) über etw im Klaren sein

if you put or set your mind to it — wenn du dich anstrengst

he had something on his mind — ihn beschäftigte etwas

I've a lot on my mind — ich muss mich um (so) viele Dinge kümmern

you are always on my mind — ich denke ständig an dich

keep your mind on the job — bleib mit den Gedanken or dem Kopf bei der Arbeit

she couldn't get or put the song/him out of her mind —

you can put that idea out of your mind! — den Gedanken kannst du dir aus dem Kopf schlagen!

to take sb's mind off things — jdn auf andere Gedanken bringen

to take sb's mind off sth — jdn etw vergessen lassen

my mind isn't on my work — ich kann mich nicht auf meine Arbeit konzentrieren

don't let your mind dwell on the problem — grüble nicht über dieses Problem nach

he can't keep his mind off sex — er denkt nur an Sex or an nichts anderes als Sex

the idea never entered my mind — daran hatte ich überhaupt nicht gedacht

it's been going through my mind — es ging mir im Kopf herum

nothing was further from my mind — nichts lag mir ferner

his mind is set on that — er hat sich (dat) das in den Kopf gesetzt

he guessed what was in my mind — er erriet meine Gedanken

in my mind's eye — vor meinem inneren Auge

4) = memory Gedächtnis nt

it went right out of my mind — daran habe ich überhaupt nicht mehr gedacht

that quite put it out of my mind — dadurch habe ich es vergessen

to bring or call sth to mind — etw in Erinnerung rufen, an etw (acc) erinnern

5) = inclination Lust f; (= intention) Sinn m, Absicht f

I've half a mind/a good mind to... —

to be of a mind to do sth — geneigt sein, etw zu tun (geh)

6) = opinion Meinung f, Ansicht f

to change one's mind — seine Meinung ändern (about über +acc ), es sich (dat) anders überlegen

to be in two minds about sth — sich (dat) über etw (acc) nicht im Klaren sein

to be of one or of the same mind — eines Sinnes (geh) or gleicher Meinung sein

I'm of the same mind as you — ich denke wie du, ich bin deiner Meinung

with one mind —

to my mind he's wrong — meiner Ansicht nach or nach meiner Meinung irrt er sich

7) = sanity Verstand m, Sinne pl

his mind was wandering (out of boredom etc) — seine Gedanken wanderten umher

to lose one's mind — verrückt werden, den Verstand verlieren

nobody in his right mind —

while the balance of his mind was disturbed (Jur) — wegen Verlusts des seelischen Gleichgewichts

8)

set structures __diams; in mind to bear or keep sth in mind — etw nicht vergessen; facts also, application etw im Auge behalten

to bear or keep sb in mind — an jdn denken; applicant also jdn im Auge behalten

with this in mind... — mit diesem Gedanken im Hinterkopf...

to have sb/sth in mind — an jdn/etw denken

to have in mind to do sth — vorhaben or im Sinn haben, etw zu tun

to have it in mind to do sth — beabsichtigen or sich (dat) vorgenommen haben, etw zu tun

it puts me in mind of sb/sth — es weckt in mir Erinnerungen an jdn/etw

to go out of one's mind — verrückt werden, den Verstand verlieren

to be out of one's mind — verrückt sein

to go out of one's mind with worry/grief — vor Sorge/Trauer den Verstand verlieren

to drive sb out of his mind — jdn um den Verstand bringen, jdn wahnsinnig machen

I'm bored out of my mind — ich langweile mich zu Tode

2. TRANSITIVE VERB

1) = look after aufpassen auf (+acc); sb's chair, seat frei halten

I'm minding the shop (fig) — ich sehe nach dem Rechten

2) = be careful of aufpassen auf (+acc); (= pay attention to) achten auf (+acc); (= act in accordance with) beachten

mind what you're doing! —

mind what you're doing with that car mind what I say! (= do as I tell you) — pass mit dem Auto auf lass dir das gesagt sein hör auf das, was ich dir sage

mind how you go — passen Sie auf, wo Sie hintreten

mind your language! — drück dich anständig aus!

mind the step! (Brit) — Vorsicht Stufe!

mind your head! (Brit) — Kopf einziehen (inf), Vorsicht, niedrige Tür/Decke etc

mind your feet! (Brit) (when sitting) — zieh die Füße ein!; (when moving) pass auf, wo du hintrittst!

mind your own business — kümmern Sie sich um Ihre eigenen Angelegenheiten

3) = care about sich kümmern um; (= object to) etwas haben gegen

she minds/doesn't mind it — es macht ihr etwas/nichts aus

I don't mind the cold — die Kälte macht mir nichts aus

I don't mind what he does —

I don't mind four but six is too many — ich habe nichts gegen vier, aber sechs sind zu viel

do you mind coming with me? — würde es dir etwas ausmachen mitzukommen?

would you mind opening the door? — wären Sie so freundlich, die Tür aufzumachen?

do you mind my smoking? —

I don't mind telling you, I was shocked — ich war schockiert, das kannst du mir glauben

I hope you don't mind my asking you/sitting here — ich hoffe, Sie haben nichts dagegen, wenn ich Sie frage/dass ich hier sitze

don't mind me — lass dich (durch mich) nicht stören; (iro) nimm auf mich keine Rücksicht

I wouldn't mind a cup of tea — ich hätte nichts gegen eine Tasse Tee

never mind the expense — (es ist) egal, was es kostet

never mind that now — das ist jetzt nicht wichtig, lass das doch jetzt

never mind your back, I'm worried about... — dein Rücken ist mir doch egal, ich mache mir Sorgen um...

never mind him — kümmere dich nicht um ihn

3. INTRANSITIVE VERB

1) = care, worry sich kümmern, sich (dat) etwas daraus machen; (= object) etwas dagegen haben

he doesn't seem to mind about anything —

I wish he minded a little — ich wünschte, es würde ihm etwas ausmachen or ihn ein bisschen kümmern

nobody seemed to mind — es schien keinem etwas auszumachen, niemand schien etwas dagegen zu haben

I'd prefer to stand, if you don't mind — ich würde lieber stehen, wenn es Ihnen recht ist

do you mind? — macht es Ihnen etwas aus?

do you mind! (iro) —

do you mind if I open or would you mind if I opened the window? — macht es Ihnen etwas aus, wenn ich das Fenster öffne?

I don't mind if I do — ich hätte nichts dagegen __diams; never mind macht nichts, ist doch egal; (in exasperation) ist ja auch egal, schon gut

never mind, you'll find another — mach dir nichts draus, du findest bestimmt einen anderen

oh, never mind, I'll do it myself — ach, lass (es) or schon gut, ich mache es selbst

never mind about that now! —

never mind about what you said to him, what did he say to you? — es ist doch egal or unwichtig, was du zu ihm gesagt hast, was hat er zu dir gesagt?

never mind about that mistake — mach dir nichts aus dem Fehler

never mind about your shoes (in exasperation) — deine Schuhe sind mir doch egal

I'm not going to finish school, never mind go to university — ich werde die Schule nicht beenden und schon gar nicht zur Universität gehen __diams; never you mind! kümmere du dich mal nicht darum

2) = be sure aufpassen

mind and see if... — sieh zu, ob...

mind you get that done — sieh zu, dass du das fertig bekommst

I'm not saying I'll do it, mind — ich will damit aber nicht sagen, dass ich es tue

he's not a bad lad, mind, just... — er ist eigentlich kein schlechter Junge, nur...

he didn't do it, mind — er hat es (ja) nicht getan __diams; mind you

mind you, I'd rather not go — ich würde eigentlich or allerdings lieber nicht gehen

it was raining at the time, mind you — allerdings hat es da geregnet

mind you, he did try/ask — er hat es immerhin versucht/hat immerhin gefragt

he's quite good, mind you — er ist eigentlich ganz gut

4. PHRASAL VERB

* * *

mind [maınd]

A s

1. Sinn m, Gemüt n, Herz n:

his mind was on her all time er musste die ganze Zeit an sie denken;

go through sb’s mind jemandem durch den Kopf gehen;

have sth on one’s mind etwas auf dem Herzen haben;

that might take his mind off his worries das lenkt ihn vielleicht von seinen Sorgen ab;

his mind was not fully on the job er war nicht ganz bei der Sache; → weight A 7

2. Seele f, Verstand m, Geist m:

before one’s mind’s eye vor seinem geistigen Auge;

see sth in one’s mind’s eye etwas im Geiste vor sich sehen;

be of sound mind, be in one’s right mind bei (vollem) Verstand sein;

anybody in their right mind jeder halbwegs Normale;

it is all in the mind das ist rein seelisch bedingt oder reine Einbildung (Krankheit etc);

of sound mind and memory JUR im Vollbesitz seiner geistigen Kräfte;

of unsound mind geistesgestört, unzurechnungsfähig;

be out of one’s mind nicht (recht) bei Sinnen sein, verrückt sein;

drive ( oder send) sb out of their mind jemanden verrückt machen;

lose one’s mind den Verstand verlieren;

close ( oder shut) one’s mind to sth sich gegen etwas verschließen;

have an open mind unvoreingenommen sein;

keep an open mind sich noch nicht festlegen;

cast back one’s mind sich zurückversetzen (to nach, in akk);

enter sb’s mind jemandem in den Sinn kommen;

give ( oder put, set) one’s mind to sth sich mit einer Sache befassen, sich einer Sache widmen;

pay no mind to nicht achten auf (akk);

put sth out of one’s mind sich etwas aus dem Kopf schlagen;

read sb’s mind jemandes Gedanken lesen;

set one’s mind on sth sich etwas in den Kopf setzen;

set one’s mind on doing sth es sich in den Kopf setzen, etwas zu tun;

it has slipped (from) my mind es ist mir entfallen; → blow¹ C 7, presence 1

3. Geist m ( auch PHIL):

the human mind;

things of the mind geistige Dinge;

his is a fine mind er hat einen feinen Verstand, er ist ein kluger Kopf;

one of the greatest minds of his time fig einer der größten Geister seiner Zeit;

the best minds in the country die klügsten Köpfe im Lande;

(the triumph of) mind over matter der Sieg des Geistes über die Materie; → history 1

4. Meinung f, Ansicht f:

in ( oder to) my mind

a) meiner Ansicht nach, meines Erachtens,

b) nach meinem Sinn oder Geschmack;

be of sb’s mind jemandes Meinung sein;

change one’s mind sich anders besinnen, es sich anders überlegen;

change one’s mind about seine Meinung ändern über (akk);

speak one’s mind (freely) seine Meinung frei äußern;

give sb a piece ( oder bit) of one’s mind jemandem gründlich die Meinung sagen;

know one’s (own) mind wissen, was man will;

be in (US of) two minds about mit sich selbst nicht einig sein über (akk);

there can be no two minds about it darüber kann es keine geteilte Meinung geben;

be of one mind einer Meinung sein (about, on über akk);

many men, many minds (Sprichwort) viele Köpfe, viele Sinne

5. Neigung f, Lust f, Absicht f:

have a good (half a) mind to do sth gute (nicht übel) Lust haben, etwas zu tun;

have sth in mind etwas im Sinn haben;

this is exactly what I had in mind das ist genau das, was mir vorschwebte oder was ich mir vorstellte;

I have you in mind ich denke (dabei) an dich;

have it in mind to do sth beabsichtigen, etwas zu tun;

make up one’s mind

a) sich entschließen, einen Entschluss fassen,

b) zu dem Schluss oder zu der Überzeugung kommen ( that dass), sich klar werden ( about über akk);

have you made up your mind yet? (im Restaurant) haben Sie schon gewählt?;

I can’t make up your mind! du musst deine Entscheidung(en) schon selbst treffen!

6. Erinnerung f, Gedächtnis n:

bear ( oder keep) sth in mind (immer) an eine Sache denken, etwas nicht vergessen, etwas bedenken, etwas im Auge halten;

bring back ( oder call) sth to mind

a) etwas ins Gedächtnis zurückrufen, an eine Sache erinnern,

b) sich etwas ins Gedächtnis zurückrufen, sich an eine Sache erinnern;

I can’t get it out of my mind ich muss ständig daran denken, es beschäftigt mich ständig;

it went ( right, umg clean) out of his mind er hat es (ganz oder total) vergessen;

put sb in mind of sth jemanden an etwas erinnern;

nothing comes to mind nichts fällt einem (dabei) ein;

from time out of mind seit undenklichen Zeiten; → erase 3, wipe out 2

7. Christian Science: Gott m

B v/t

1. beachten, achtgeben oder achten auf (akk):

mind you write umg denk daran oder vergiss nicht zu schreiben

2. achtgeben auf (akk), sich hüten vor (dat):

mind your head! stoß dir den Kopf nicht an!; → step A 1, A 7, A 9

3. sorgen für, sehen nach:

mind the fire nach dem Feuer sehen;

mind the children sich um die Kinder kümmern, die Kinder hüten oder beaufsichtigen;

mind your own business kümmere dich um deine eigenen Dinge!;

never mind him kümmere dich nicht um ihn!;

never you mind what … umg es geht dich gar nichts an, was …;

don’t mind me lassen Sie sich durch mich nicht stören!

4. etwas haben gegen, etwas nicht gern sehen oder mögen, sich stoßen an (dat):

do you mind my smoking? haben Sie etwas dagegen oder stört es Sie, wenn ich rauche?;

would you mind coming? würden Sie so freundlich sein zu kommen?;

she was, she didn’t mind admitting, very lonely sie war, wie sie unumwunden oder freimütig zugab, sehr einsam;

I don’t mind it ich habe nichts dagegen, meinetwegen, von mir aus (gern);

I would not mind a cup of coffee ich hätte nichts gegen eine Tasse Kaffee

5. schott sich erinnern an (akk)

C v/i

1. aufpassen:

mind (you)

a) wohlgemerkt,

b) allerdings;

he’s very nice, mind you, but … er ist eigentlich sehr nett, aber …;

never mind lass es gut sein!, es hat nichts zu sagen!, macht nichts!, schon gut! ( → C 2)

2. etwas dagegen haben:

I don’t mind ich habe nichts dagegen, meinetwegen, von mir aus (gern);

I don’t mind if he goes meinetwegen kann er gehen;

do you mind if I smoke? haben Sie etwas dagegen oder stört es Sie, wenn ich rauche?;

I don’t mind if I do umg

a) ja, ganz gern oder ich möchte schon,

b) ich bin so frei;

nobody seemed to mind es schien niemandem etwas auszumachen;

do you mind!

a) ich muss doch sehr bitten!,

b) passen Sie doch auf!;

do you mind!, can’t you see I’m busy? sehen Sie (denn) nicht, dass ich beschäftigt bin?;

he minds a great deal es macht ihm sehr viel aus, es stört ihn sehr;

never mind mach dir nichts draus! ( → C 1)

3. mind out Br aufpassen ( for auf akk)

* * *
1. noun
1) (remembrance)

bear or keep something in mind — an etwas (Akk.) denken; etwas nicht vergessen

have in mind to do something — vorhaben, etwas zu tun

bring something to mind — etwas in Erinnerung rufen

something comes into somebody's mind — jemandem fällt etwas ein

it went out of my mind — ich habe es vergessen; es ist mir entfallen

put something/somebody out of one's mind — etwas/jemanden aus seinem Gedächtnis streichen

2) (opinion)

give somebody a piece of one's mind — jemandem gründlich die Meinung sagen

in or to my mind — meiner Meinung od. Ansicht nach

be of one or of the same mind, be in one mind — einer Meinung sein

be in two minds about something — [sich (Dat.)] unschlüssig über etwas (Akk.) sein

change one's mind — seine Meinung ändern

have a mind of one's own — seinen eigenen Kopf haben

I have a good mind/half a mind to do that — ich hätte große Lust/nicht übel Lust, das zu tun

make up one's mind, make one's mind up — sich entscheiden

make up one's mind to do something — sich entschließen, etwas zu tun

read somebody's mind — jemandes Gedanken lesen

3) (direction of thoughts)

his mind is on other things — er ist mit den Gedanken woanders

give or put or turn one's mind to — sich konzentrieren auf (+ Akk.) [Arbeit, Aufgabe, Angelegenheit]

I have had somebody/something on my mind — jemand/etwas hat mich beschäftigt; (worried) ich habe mir Sorgen wegen jemandem/etwas gemacht

she has a lot of things on her mind — sie hat viele Sorgen

something preys or weighs on somebody's mind — etwas macht jemandem zu schaffen

take somebody's mind off something — jemanden von etwas ablenken

keep one's mind on something — sich auf etwas (Akk.) konzentrieren

close one's mind to something — sich einer Sache (Dat.) verschließen (geh.)

4) (way of thinking and feeling) Denkweise, die

frame of mind — [seelische] Verfassung

state of mind — [Geistes]zustand, der

be in a frame of mind to do something — in der Verfassung sein, etwas zu tun

have a logical mind — logisch denken

5) (seat of consciousness, thought, volition) Geist, der

it's all in the mind — es ist alles nur Einstellung

in one's mind — im stillen

in my mind's eye — vor meinem geistigen Auge; im Geiste

nothing could be further from my mind than... — nichts läge mir ferner, als...

6) (intellectual powers) Verstand, der; Intellekt, der

have a very good mind — einen klaren od. scharfen Verstand haben

great minds think alike — (joc.) große Geister denken [eben] gleich

7) (normal mental faculties) Verstand, der

lose or go out of one's mind — den Verstand verlieren

be out of one's mind — den Verstand verloren haben

in one's right mind — bei klarem Verstand
2. transitive verb
1) (heed)

don't mind what he says — gib nichts auf sein Gerede

mind what I say — glaub mir

let's do it, and never mind the expense — machen wir es doch, egal, was es kostet

2) (concern oneself about)

he minds a lot what people think of him — es ist für ihn sehr wichtig, was die Leute von ihm denken

I can't afford a bicycle, never mind a car — ich kann mir kein Fahrrad leisten, geschweige denn ein Auto

never mind him/that — (don't be anxious) er/das kann dir doch egal sein (ugs.)

never mind how/where... — es tut nichts zur Sache, wie/wo...

don't mind me — nimm keine Rücksicht auf mich; (don't let my presence disturb you) lass dich [durch mich] nicht stören; (iron.) nimm bloß keine Rücksicht auf mich

mind the doors! — Vorsicht an den Türen!

mind one's P's and Q's — sich anständig benehmen

3) usu. neg. or interrog. (object to)

did he mind being woken up? — hat es ihm was ausgemacht, aufgeweckt zu werden?

would you mind opening the door? — würdest du bitte die Tür öffnen?

do you mind my smoking? — stört es Sie od. haben Sie etwas dagegen, wenn ich rauche?

I wouldn't mind a walk — ich hätte nichts gegen einen Spaziergang

4) (remember and take care)

mind you don't leave anything behind — denk daran, nichts liegen lassen!

mind how you go! — pass auf! sei vorsichtig!; (as general farewell) mach's gut! (ugs.)

mind you get this work done — sieh zu, dass du mit dieser Arbeit fertig wirst!

5) (have charge of) aufpassen auf (+ Akk.)

mind the shop or (Amer.) the store — (fig.) sich um den Laden kümmern (ugs.)
3. intransitive verb
1)

mind! — Vorsicht!; Achtung!

2) usu. in imper. (take note)

follow the signposts, mind, or... — denk daran und halte dich an die Wegweiser, sonst...

I didn't know that, mind, or... — das habe ich allerdings nicht gewusst, sonst...

3) (care, object)

do you mind? — (may I?) hätten Sie etwas dagegen?; (please do not) ich muss doch sehr bitten

he doesn't mind about your using the car — er hat nichts dagegen, wenn Sie den Wagen benutzen

if you don't mind — wenn es dir recht ist

4) (give heed)

never [you] mind — (it's not important) macht nichts; ist nicht schlimm; (it's none of your business) sei nicht so neugierig

never mind: I can do it — schon gut - das kann ich machen

never mind about that now! — lass das jetzt mal [sein/liegen]!

never mind about him - what happened to her? — er interessiert mich nicht - was ist ihr passiert?

Phrasal Verbs:

- mind out

* * *

n.

Absicht -en f.

Ansicht -en f.

Geist -er m.

Gemüt -er n.

Meinung -en f.

Phantasie -n f.

Sinn -e m.

Verstand -¨e m. v.

beachten v.

English-german dictionary > mind
7 mind

1.
(the power by which one thinks etc; the intelligence or understanding: The child already has the mind of an adult.) pamet
2. verb
1) (to look after or supervise (eg a child): mind the baby.) paziti na kaj

2) (to be upset by; to object to: You must try not to mind when he criticizes your work.) vznemirjati se

3) (to be careful of: Mind (= be careful not to trip over) the step!) paziti

4) (to pay attention to or obey: You should mind your parents' words/advice.) upoštevati
3. interjection
(be careful!: Mind! There's a car coming!) pazi!

- - minded
- mindful
- mindless
- mindlessly
- mindlessness
- mindreader
- at/in the back of one's mind
- change one's mind
- be out of one's mind
- do you mind!
- have a good mind to
- have half a mind to
- have a mind to
- in one's mind's eye
- in one's right mind
- keep one's mind on
- know one's own mind
- make up one's mind
- mind one's own business
- never mind
- on one's mind
- put someone in mind of
- put in mind of
- speak one's mind
- take/keep one's mind off
- to my mind
* * *
I [máind]
noun

spomin; mišljenje, mnenje, nazor; misel; namen, volja, želja; pamet, razum; duh, duša; razpoloženje, čud; srce

the human mind — človekov duh

history of the mind — idejna zgodovina

things of the mind — duhovne stvari

his is a fine mind — je pametna glava

one of the greatest minds of his time — eden največjih mislecev svojega časa

absence of mind — raztresenost

presence of mind — prisotnost duha

to be in two minds about s.th. — kolebati, omahovati

to be of s.o.'s mind — strinjati se s kom, biti istega mnenja

to be of the same mind — biti istega mnenja

to bear ( —ali have, keep) s.th. in mind — spomniti se zapomniti si

to bring ( —ali call) to mind — spomniti (se)

to cast one's mind back — v duhu se vrniti nazaj

to change one's mind — premisliti se

the mind's eye — vizija

in one's mind's eye — v duhu, v domišljiji

to close one's mind to — zapreti se vase, zapreti srce čemu

to come to mind — priti na misel

to enter s.o.'s mind — priti komu na misel

a frame ( —ali state) of mind — duševno stanje, trenutno razpoloženje

to give one's mind to s.th. — lotiti se česa zanimati se za kaj

to give s.o. a piece ( —ali bit) of one's mind — učiti koga kozjih molitvic, odkrito povedati svoje mnenje o kom

to have a good ( —ali great) mind to — nameniti se, biti trdno odločen za kaj

to have half a mind to — biti skoraj odločen za kaj

to have s.th. on one's mind — biti zaskrbljen zastran česa stalno misliti na kaj

to have an open mind — biti brez predsodkov, nepristranski

to bave it in mind to do s.th. — nameravati kaj storiti

to have s.th. in mind — nameravati, imeti načrt, izbrati

to have no mind for — ne imeti volje za kaj

to keep one's mind on — kar naprej misliti na kaj

to keep an open mind — počakati z odločitvijo

to know one's own mind — biti odločen, vedeti kaj hočeš

not to know one's own mind — biti poln dvomov, obotavljati se

to lose one's mind — znoreti

to make up one's mind — odločiti se

to make up one's mind to s.th. — sprijazniti se s čim

to ( —ali in) my mind — po mojem mnenju, meni pri srcu

many men, many minds — kolikor glav, toliko misli

month's mind — porodničina želja po jedi

my mind misgives me — ne slutim nič dobrega

to open one's mind to — zaupati komu svoje misli (čustva)

to pass ( —ali go) out of mind — iti v pozabo, pozabiti kaj

to prey on one's mind — ležati na duši

to put s.o. in mind of s.th. — spomniti koga na kaj

to put s.tb. out of one's mind — izbiti si kaj iz glave

in one's right mind — pri zdravi pameti

out of one's (right) mind — nor

to read s.o.'s mind — brati komu misli, uganiti komu misli

juridically of sound mind and memory — priseben

to set one's mind on — ubiti si kaj v glavo, odločiti se za kaj

out of sight, out of mind — kar ne vidiš, hitro pozabiš

to slip one's mind — pozabiti

to speak one's mind — odkrito govoriti

to take one's mind off — prenehati misliti na kaj

to tell s.o. one's mind — komu odkrito povedati svoje mnenje

time out of mind — davno, pozabljeni časi

to turn one's mind to — obrniti pozornost na kaj

to turn over in one's mind — skrbno pretehtati, premisliti

it was a weight off my mind — kamen se mi je odvalil od srca
II [máind]
1.

transitive verb

paziti na kaj, meniti se za kaj, skrbeti, brigati, ozirati se na kaj; nasprotovati, ugovarjati; archaic spomniti (of na), spomniti se na kaj;

2.

intransitive verb

paziti; biti proti

to mind one's book — pridno se učiti

to mind one's own business — pometati pred svojim pragom, brigati se zase

if you don't mind — če nimaš nič proti

don't mind me — ne oziraj se name, ne pusti se motiti

would you mind coming! — bi prišel, prosim!

do you mind my smoking? — imaš kaj proti, če kadim?

colloquially mind you write — glej, da boš pisal

colloquially I don't mind if I do — prav rad to storim

mind and do that — pazi, da boš to res storil

slang to mind one's eye — biti previden

mind (yon)! — zapomni si!

never mind! — nič ne de, ni važno, ne vznemirjaj se, ne oziraj se na to!

never mind him! — ne brigaj se zanj!

slang mind out! — pazi, umakni se!

he minds a great deal — je proti, zelo ga moti

to mind one's P's and Q's — biti previden v besedah in vedenju

I shouldn't mind (a drink) — rad bi (kaj popil), nimam nič proti

mind the step! — pazi na stopnico!

English-Slovenian dictionary > mind
8 the fires of hell

геенна огненная

The fires of Hell burned fiercely before his mind's eye. (W. S. Maugham, ‘Of Human Bondage’, ch. 17) — Перед его мысленным взором пылала геенна огненная.

Large English-Russian phrasebook > the fires of hell
9 About the author

MORTON WAGMAN is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. His most recent works include The Human Mind According to Artificial Intelligence (Praeger, 1999) and Scientific Discovery Processes in Humans and Computers (Praeger, 1999).

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > About the author
10 keeping in mind

1) Общая лексика: учитывая (напр., keeping in mind the social and human implications of the reform proposals, the Director-General gave instructions (...)), исходя из, памятуя о

2) Математика: имея в виду, принимая во внимание, соблюдая

Универсальный англо-русский словарь > keeping in mind
11 turn smth. over in one's mind

обдумывать что-л., перебирать что-л. в уме

...he nodded his head gravely as though he had turned the subject over in his mind. (D. du Maurier, ‘I'll Never Be Young Again’, part I, ch. III) —...отец глубокомысленно кивнул головой, как будто обдумал этот вопрос со всех сторон.

He turned over in his mind every possible thing that might have happened. (W. S. Maugham, ‘Of Human Bondage’, ch. 78) — Филип перебрал в уме все, что могло случиться.

Large English-Russian phrasebook > turn smth. over in one's mind
12 on the make

разг.

1) делающий карьеру; думающий только о своих интересах, о собственном обогащении, стремящийся к наживе любой ценой [первонач. амер.]

She was not amusing or clever, her mind was common; she had a vulgar shrewdness which revolted him, she had no gentleness nor softness. As she would have put it herself, she was on the make. (W. S. Maugham, ‘Of Human Bondage’, ch. 59) — Милдред не казалась ему ни интересной, ни остроумной, она была вполне заурядной особой, ее житейская хитрость отвратительна, ей недоставало доброты, душевности. Как она признавалась сама, она думала только об одном - как бы получше устроиться.

In a city where everybody was "hustling", everybody, as they phrased it, "on the make", why should anyone take a second glance at Peter Gudge? (U. Sinclair, ‘100%’, ch. 1) — В городе, где все спешили, где каждый пробивался как умел, никому не было дела до Питера Гаджа.

Of course he's as sly as they come, and terribly on the make... (G. Vidal, ‘Washington, D. C.’, part I, ch. II) — Генри хитрая бестия, он пойдет в гору...

2) находящийся в развитии, в процессе становления

The events of 1848 had destroyed for good the stable fragility of Metternich's German Confederation; after 1848 both Prussia and Austria were "on the make". (A. J. P. Taylor, ‘The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918’, ch. II) — События 1848 года навсегда уничтожили хрупкое здание меттерниховского Германского союза. После 1848 года Пруссия и Австрия находились в процессе становления.

3) в поисках любовных приключений

The park was swarming with sailors on the make. (RHD) — В парке было полно моряков, ищущих любовных приключений.

Large English-Russian phrasebook > on the make
13 человеческий разум

the human mind

Большой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > человеческий разум
14 человеческий разум

the human mind

Русско-английский словарь по общей лексике > человеческий разум
15 человеческий разум

the human mind

Русско-английский синонимический словарь > человеческий разум
16 ihmishenki

• the human spirit

• human mind

• person

• human life

• the human mind

• human spirit

• life

Suomi-Englanti sanakirja > ihmishenki
17 Bibliography

■ Aitchison, J. (1987). Noam Chomsky: Consensus and controversy. New York: Falmer Press.

■ Anderson, J. R. (1980). Cognitive psychology and its implications. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

■ Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Anderson, J. R. (1995). Cognitive psychology and its implications (4th ed.). New York: W. H. Freeman.

■ Archilochus (1971). In M. L. West (Ed.), Iambi et elegi graeci (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

■ Armstrong, D. M. (1990). The causal theory of the mind. In W. G. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and cognition: A reader (pp. 37-47). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. (Originally published in 1981 in The nature of mind and other essays, Ithaca, NY: University Press).

■ Atkins, P. W. (1992). Creation revisited. Oxford: W. H. Freeman & Company.

■ Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Bacon, F. (1878). Of the proficience and advancement of learning divine and human. In The works of Francis Bacon (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: Hurd & Houghton.

■ Bacon, R. (1928). Opus majus (Vol. 2). R. B. Burke (Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

■ Bar-Hillel, Y. (1960). The present status of automatic translation of languages. In F. L. Alt (Ed.), Advances in computers (Vol. 1). New York: Academic Press.

■ Barr, A., & E. A. Feigenbaum (Eds.) (1981). The handbook of artificial intelligence (Vol. 1). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

■ Barr, A., & E. A. Feigenbaum (Eds.) (1982). The handbook of artificial intelligence (Vol. 2). Los Altos, CA: William Kaufman.

■ Barron, F. X. (1963). The needs for order and for disorder as motives in creative activity. In C. W. Taylor & F. X. Barron (Eds.), Scientific creativity: Its rec ognition and development (pp. 153-160). New York: Wiley.

■ Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Bartley, S. H. (1969). Principles of perception. London: Harper & Row.

■ Barzun, J. (1959). The house of intellect. New York: Harper & Row.

■ Beach, F. A., D. O. Hebb, C. T. Morgan & H. W. Nissen (Eds.) (1960). The neu ropsychology of Lashley. New York: McGraw-Hill.

■ Berkeley, G. (1996). Principles of human knowledge: Three Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1710.)

■ Berlin, I. (1953). The hedgehog and the fox: An essay on Tolstoy's view of history. NY: Simon & Schuster.

■ Bierwisch, J. (1970). Semantics. In J. Lyons (Ed.), New horizons in linguistics. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

■ Black, H. C. (1951). Black's law dictionary. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.

■ Bloom, A. (1981). The linguistic shaping of thought: A study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

■ Bobrow, D. G., & D. A. Norman (1975). Some principles of memory schemata. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding: Stud ies in Cognitive Science (pp. 131-149). New York: Academic Press.

■ Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial intelligence and natural man. New York: Basic Books.

■ Boden, M. A. (1981). Minds and mechanisms. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

■ Boden, M. A. (1990a). The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms. London: Cardinal.

■ Boden, M. A. (1990b). The philosophy of artificial intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

■ Boden, M. A. (1994). Precis of The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms. Behavioral and brain sciences 17, 519-570.

■ Boden, M. (1996). Creativity. In M. Boden (Ed.), Artificial Intelligence (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press.

■ Bolter, J. D. (1984). Turing's man: Western culture in the computer age. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

■ Bolton, N. (1972). The psychology of thinking. London: Methuen.

■ Bourne, L. E. (1973). Some forms of cognition: A critical analysis of several papers. In R. Solso (Ed.), Contemporary issues in cognitive psychology (pp. 313324). Loyola Symposium on Cognitive Psychology (Chicago 1972). Washington, DC: Winston.

■ Bransford, J. D., N. S. McCarrell, J. J. Franks & K. E. Nitsch (1977). Toward unexplaining memory. In R. Shaw & J. D. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, acting, and knowing (pp. 431-466). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Breger, L. (1981). Freud's unfinished journey. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

■ Brehmer, B. (1986). In one word: Not from experience. In H. R. Arkes & K. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader (pp. 705-719). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Bresnan, J. (1978). A realistic transformational grammar. In M. Halle, J. Bresnan & G. A. Miller (Eds.), Linguistic theory and psychological reality (pp. 1-59). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Brislin, R. W., W. J. Lonner & R. M. Thorndike (Eds.) (1973). Cross- cultural research methods. New York: Wiley.

■ Bronowski, J. (1977). A sense of the future: Essays in natural philosophy. P. E. Ariotti with R. Bronowski (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Bronowski, J. (1978). The origins of knowledge and imagination. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

■ Brown, R. O. (1973). A first language: The early stages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Brown, T. (1970). Lectures on the philosophy of the human mind. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 330-387). New York: Random House/Modern Library.

■ Bruner, J. S., J. Goodnow & G. Austin (1956). A study of thinking. New York: Wiley.

■ Calvin, W. H. (1990). The cerebral symphony: Seashore reﬂections on the structure of consciousness. New York: Bantam.

■ Campbell, J. (1982). Grammatical man: Information, entropy, language, and life. New York: Simon & Schuster.

■ Campbell, J. (1989). The improbable machine. New York: Simon & Schuster.

■ Carlyle, T. (1966). On heroes, hero- worship and the heroic in history. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. (Originally published in 1841.)

■ Carnap, R. (1959). The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language [Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache]. In A. J. Ayer (Ed.), Logical positivism (pp. 60-81) A. Pap (Trans). New York: Free Press. (Originally published in 1932.)

■ Cassirer, E. (1946). Language and myth. New York: Harper and Brothers. Reprinted. New York: Dover Publications, 1953.

■ Cattell, R. B., & H. J. Butcher (1970). Creativity and personality. In P. E. Vernon (Ed.), Creativity. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books.

■ Caudill, M., & C. Butler (1990). Naturally intelligent systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

■ Chandrasekaran, B. (1990). What kind of information processing is intelligence? A perspective on AI paradigms and a proposal. In D. Partridge & R. Wilks (Eds.), The foundations of artificial intelligence: A sourcebook (pp. 14-46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Charniak, E., & McDermott, D. (1985). Introduction to artificial intelligence. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

■ Chase, W. G., & H. A. Simon (1988). The mind's eye in chess. In A. Collins & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Readings in cognitive science: A perspective from psychology and artificial intelligence (pp. 461-493). San Mateo, CA: Kaufmann.

■ Cheney, D. L., & R. M. Seyfarth (1990). How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

■ Chi, M.T.H., R. Glaser & E. Rees (1982). Expertise in problem solving. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (pp. 7-73). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton. Janua Linguarum.

■ Chomsky, N. (1964). A transformational approach to syntax. In J. A. Fodor & J. J. Katz (Eds.), The structure of language: Readings in the philosophy of lan guage (pp. 211-245). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

■ Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Chomsky, N. (1972). Language and mind (enlarged ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

■ Chomsky, N. (1979). Language and responsibility. New York: Pantheon.

■ Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of language: Its nature, origin and use. New York: Praeger Special Studies.

■ Churchland, P. (1979). Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.

■ Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

■ Clark, A. (1996). Philosophical Foundations. In M. A. Boden (Ed.), Artificial in telligence (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press.

■ Clark, H. H., & T. B. Carlson (1981). Context for comprehension. In J. Long & A. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and performance (Vol. 9, pp. 313-330). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Clarke, A. C. (1984). Profiles of the future: An inquiry into the limits of the possible. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

■ Claxton, G. (1980). Cognitive psychology: A suitable case for what sort of treatment? In G. Claxton (Ed.), Cognitive psychology: New directions (pp. 1-25). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

■ Code, M. (1985). Order and organism. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

■ Collingwood, R. G. (1972). The idea of history. New York: Oxford University Press.

■ Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self- esteem. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

■ Copland, A. (1952). Music and imagination. London: Oxford University Press.

■ Coren, S. (1994). The intelligence of dogs. New York: Bantam Books.

■ Cottingham, J. (Ed.) (1996). Western philosophy: An anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

■ Cox, C. (1926). The early mental traits of three hundred geniuses. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

■ Craik, K.J.W. (1943). The nature of explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Cronbach, L. J. (1990). Essentials of psychological testing (5th ed.). New York: HarperCollins.

■ Cronbach, L. J., & R. E. Snow (1977). Aptitudes and instructional methods. New York: Irvington. Paperback edition, 1981.

■ Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1993). The evolving self. New York: Harper Perennial.

■ Culler, J. (1976). Ferdinand de Saussure. New York: Penguin Books.

■ Curtius, E. R. (1973). European literature and the Latin Middle Ages. W. R. Trask (Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

■ D'Alembert, J.L.R. (1963). Preliminary discourse to the encyclopedia of Diderot. R. N. Schwab (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

■ Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: Avon.

■ Dampier, W. C. (1966). A history of modern science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Darwin, C. (1911). The life and letters of Charles Darwin (Vol. 1). Francis Darwin (Ed.). New York: Appleton.

■ Davidson, D. (1970) Mental events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory (pp. 79-101). Amherst: University of Massachussetts Press.

■ Davies, P. (1995). About time: Einstein's unfinished revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone.

■ Davis, R., & J. J. King (1977). An overview of production systems. In E. Elcock & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine intelligence 8. Chichester, England: Ellis Horwood.

■ Davis, R., & D. B. Lenat (1982). Knowledge- based systems in artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.

■ Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype: The gene as the unit of selection. Oxford: W. H. Freeman.

■ deKleer, J., & J. S. Brown (1983). Assumptions and ambiguities in mechanistic mental models (1983). In D. Gentner & A. L. Stevens (Eds.), Mental modes (pp. 155-190). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Dennett, D. C. (1978a). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.

■ Dennett, D. C. (1978b). Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In D. C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.

■ Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin's dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone.

■ Descartes, R. (1897-1910). Traite de l'homme. In Oeuvres de Descartes (Vol. 11, pp. 119-215). Paris: Charles Adam & Paul Tannery. (Originally published in 1634.)

■ Descartes, R. (1950). Discourse on method. L. J. Laﬂeur (Trans.). New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1637.)

■ Descartes, R. (1951). Meditation on first philosophy. L. J. Laﬂeur (Trans.). New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1641.)

■ Descartes, R. (1955). The philosophical works of Descartes. E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Trans.). New York: Dover. (Originally published in 1911 by Cambridge University Press.)

■ Descartes, R. (1967). Discourse on method (Pt. V). In E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 106-118). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1637.)

■ Descartes, R. (1970a). Discourse on method. In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 181-200). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1637.)

■ Descartes, R. (1970b). Principles of philosophy. In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 178-291). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1644.)

■ Descartes, R. (1984). Meditations on first philosophy. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murduch (Trans.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641.)

■ Descartes, R. (1986). Meditations on first philosophy. J. Cottingham (Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641 as Med itationes de prima philosophia.)

■ deWulf, M. (1956). An introduction to scholastic philosophy. Mineola, NY: Dover Books.

■ Dixon, N. F. (1981). Preconscious processing. London: Wiley.

■ Doyle, A. C. (1986). The Boscombe Valley mystery. In Sherlock Holmes: The com plete novels and stories (Vol. 1). New York: Bantam.

■ Dreyfus, H., & S. Dreyfus (1986). Mind over machine. New York: Free Press.

■ Dreyfus, H. L. (1972). What computers can't do: The limits of artificial intelligence (revised ed.). New York: Harper & Row.

■ Dreyfus, H. L., & S. E. Dreyfus (1986). Mind over machine: The power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer. New York: Free Press.

■ Edelman, G. M. (1992). Bright air, brilliant fire: On the matter of the mind. New York: Basic Books.

■ Ehrenzweig, A. (1967). The hidden order of art. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

■ Einstein, A., & L. Infeld (1938). The evolution of physics. New York: Simon & Schuster.

■ Eisenstein, S. (1947). Film sense. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

■ Everdell, W. R. (1997). The first moderns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

■ Eysenck, M. W. (1977). Human memory: Theory, research and individual difference. Oxford: Pergamon.

■ Eysenck, M. W. (1982). Attention and arousal: Cognition and performance. Berlin: Springer.

■ Eysenck, M. W. (1984). A handbook of cognitive psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Fancher, R. E. (1979). Pioneers of psychology. New York: W. W. Norton.

■ Farrell, B. A. (1981). The standing of psychoanalysis. New York: Oxford University Press.

■ Feldman, D. H. (1980). Beyond universals in cognitive development. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

■ Fetzer, J. H. (1996). Philosophy and cognitive science (2nd ed.). New York: Paragon House.

■ Finke, R. A. (1990). Creative imagery: Discoveries and inventions in visualization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Flanagan, O. (1991). The science of the mind. Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

■ Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

■ Frege, G. (1972). Conceptual notation. T. W. Bynum (Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Originally published in 1879.)

■ Frege, G. (1979). Logic. In H. Hermes, F. Kambartel & F. Kaulbach (Eds.), Gottlob Frege: Posthumous writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Originally published in 1879-1891.)

■ Freud, S. (1959). Creative writers and day-dreaming. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 9, pp. 143-153). London: Hogarth Press.

■ Freud, S. (1966). Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The stan dard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 1, pp. 295-398). London: Hogarth Press. (Originally published in 1950 as Aus den AnfaЁngen der Psychoanalyse, in London by Imago Publishing.)

■ Freud, S. (1976). Lecture 18-Fixation to traumas-the unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 16, p. 285). London: Hogarth Press.

■ Galileo, G. (1990). Il saggiatore [The assayer]. In S. Drake (Ed.), Discoveries and opinions of Galileo. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1623.)

■ Gassendi, P. (1970). Letter to Descartes. In "Objections and replies." In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 2, pp. 179-240). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641.)

■ Gazzaniga, M. S. (1988). Mind matters: How mind and brain interact to create our conscious lives. Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin in association with MIT Press/Bradford Books.

■ Genesereth, M. R., & N. J. Nilsson (1987). Logical foundations of artificial intelligence. Palo Alto, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.

■ Ghiselin, B. (1952). The creative process. New York: Mentor.

■ Ghiselin, B. (1985). The creative process. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1952.)

■ Gilhooly, K. J. (1996). Thinking: Directed, undirected and creative (3rd ed.). London: Academic Press.

■ Glass, A. L., K. J. Holyoak & J. L. Santa (1979). Cognition. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley.

■ Goody, J. (1977). The domestication of the savage mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Gruber, H. E. (1980). Darwin on man: A psychological study of scientific creativity (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

■ Gruber, H. E., & S. Davis (1988). Inching our way up Mount Olympus: The evolving systems approach to creative thinking. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Guthrie, E. R. (1972). The psychology of learning. New York: Harper. (Originally published in 1935.)

■ Habermas, J. (1972). Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press.

■ Hadamard, J. (1945). The psychology of invention in the mathematical field. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

■ Hand, D. J. (1985). Artificial intelligence and psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Harris, M. (1981). The language myth. London: Duckworth.

■ Haugeland, J. (Ed.) (1981). Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

■ Haugeland, J. (1981a). The nature and plausibility of cognitivism. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 243-281). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Haugeland, J. (1981b). Semantic engines: An introduction to mind design. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 1-34). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

■ Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial intelligence: The very idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Hawkes, T. (1977). Structuralism and semiotics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

■ Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organisation of behaviour. New York: Wiley.

■ Hebb, D. O. (1958). A textbook of psychology. Philadelphia: Saunders.

■ Hegel, G.W.F. (1910). The phenomenology of mind. J. B. Baille (Trans.). London: Sonnenschein. (Originally published as Phaenomenologie des Geistes, 1807.)

■ Heisenberg, W. (1958). Physics and philosophy. New York: Harper & Row.

■ Hempel, C. G. (1966). Philosophy of natural science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall.

■ Herman, A. (1997). The idea of decline in Western history. New York: Free Press.

■ Herrnstein, R. J., & E. G. Boring (Eds.) (1965). A source book in the history of psy chology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Herzmann, E. (1964). Mozart's creative process. In P. H. Lang (Ed.), The creative world of Mozart (pp. 17-30). London: Oldbourne Press.

■ Hilgard, E. R. (1957). Introduction to psychology. London: Methuen.

■ Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. London: Crooke.

■ Hofstadter, D. R. (1979). Goedel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid. New York: Basic Books.

■ Holliday, S. G., & M. J. Chandler (1986). Wisdom: Explorations in adult competence. Basel, Switzerland: Karger.

■ Horn, J. L. (1986). In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (Vol. 3). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

■ Hull, C. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

■ Hume, D. (1955). An inquiry concerning human understanding. New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1748.)

■ Hume, D. (1975). An enquiry concerning human understanding. In L. A. SelbyBigge (Ed.), Hume's enquiries (3rd. ed., revised P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon. (Spelling and punctuation revised.) (Originally published in 1748.)

■ Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), Hume's enquiries (3rd. ed., revised P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon. (With some modifications of spelling and punctuation.) (Originally published in 1690.)

■ Hunt, E. (1973). The memory we must have. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language. (pp. 343-371) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

■ Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

■ Inhelder, B., & J. Piaget (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence. New York: Basic Books. (Originally published in 1955 as De la logique de l'enfant a` la logique de l'adolescent. [Paris: Presses Universitaire de France])

■ James, W. (1890a). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Dover Books.

■ James, W. (1890b). The principles of psychology. New York: Henry Holt.

■ Jevons, W. S. (1900). The principles of science (2nd ed.). London: Macmillan.

■ Johnson, G. (1986). Machinery of the mind: Inside the new science of artificial intelli gence. New York: Random House.

■ Johnson, M. L. (1988). Mind, language, machine. New York: St. Martin's Press.

■ Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Toward a cognitive science of language, inference, and consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1988). The computer and the mind: An introduction to cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Jones, E. (1961). The life and work of Sigmund Freud. L. Trilling & S. Marcus (Eds.). London: Hogarth.

■ Jones, R. V. (1985). Complementarity as a way of life. In A. P. French & P. J. Kennedy (Eds.), Niels Bohr: A centenary volume. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Kant, I. (1933). Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed.). N. K. Smith (Trans.). London: Macmillan. (Originally published in 1781 as Kritik der reinen Vernunft.)

■ Kant, I. (1891). Solution of the general problems of the Prolegomena. In E. Belfort (Trans.), Kant's Prolegomena. London: Bell. (With minor modifications.) (Originally published in 1783.)

■ Katona, G. (1940). Organizing and memorizing: Studies in the psychology of learning and teaching. New York: Columbia University Press.

■ Kaufman, A. S. (1979). Intelligent testing with the WISC-R. New York: Wiley.

■ Koestler, A. (1964). The act of creation. New York: Arkana (Penguin).

■ Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. (pp. 151-235) New York: Academic Press.

■ KoЁhler, W. (1925). The mentality of apes. New York: Liveright.

■ KoЁhler, W. (1927). The mentality of apes (2nd ed.). Ella Winter (Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

■ KoЁhler, W. (1930). Gestalt psychology. London: G. Bell.

■ KoЁhler, W. (1947). Gestalt psychology. New York: Liveright.

■ KoЁhler, W. (1969). The task of Gestalt psychology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

■ Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

■ Langer, E. J. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

■ Langer, S. (1962). Philosophical sketches. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

■ Langley, P., H. A. Simon, G. L. Bradshaw & J. M. Zytkow (1987). Scientific dis covery: Computational explorations of the creative process. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Lashley, K. S. (1951). The problem of serial order in behavior. In L. A. Jeffress (Ed.), Cerebral mechanisms in behavior, the Hixon Symposium (pp. 112-146) New York: Wiley.

■ LeDoux, J. E., & W. Hirst (1986). Mind and brain: Dialogues in cognitive neuroscience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Lehnert, W. (1978). The process of question answering. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Leiber, J. (1991). Invitation to cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell.

■ Lenat, D. B., & G. Harris (1978). Designing a rule system that searches for scientific discoveries. In D. A. Waterman & F. Hayes-Roth (Eds.), Pattern directed inference systems (pp. 25-52) New York: Academic Press.

■ Levenson, T. (1995). Measure for measure: A musical history of science. New York: Touchstone. (Originally published in 1994.)

■ Leґvi-Strauss, C. (1963). Structural anthropology. C. Jacobson & B. Grundfest Schoepf (Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Originally published in 1958.)

■ Levine, M. W., & J. M. Schefner (1981). Fundamentals of sensation and perception. London: Addison-Wesley.

■ Lewis, C. I. (1946). An analysis of knowledge and valuation. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.

■ Lighthill, J. (1972). A report on artificial intelligence. Unpublished manuscript, Science Research Council.

■ Lipman, M., A. M. Sharp & F. S. Oscanyan (1980). Philosophy in the classroom. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

■ Lippmann, W. (1965). Public opinion. New York: Free Press. (Originally published in 1922.)

■ Locke, J. (1956). An essay concerning human understanding. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. (Originally published in 1690.)

■ Locke, J. (1975). An essay concerning human understanding. P. H. Nidditch (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon. (Originally published in 1690.) (With spelling and punctuation modernized and some minor modifications of phrasing.)

■ Lopate, P. (1994). The art of the personal essay. New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books.

■ Lorimer, F. (1929). The growth of reason. London: Kegan Paul. Machlup, F., & U. Mansfield (Eds.) (1983). The study of information. New York: Wiley.

■ Manguel, A. (1996). A history of reading. New York: Viking.

■ Margolis, H. (1987). Patterns, thinking, and cognition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

■ Markey, J. F. (1928). The symbolic process. London: Kegan Paul.

■ Martin, R. M. (1969). On Ziff's "Natural and formal languages." In S. Hook (Ed.), Language and philosophy: A symposium (pp. 249-263). New York: New York University Press.

■ Mazlish, B. (1993). The fourth discontinuity: the co- evolution of humans and machines. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

■ McCarthy, J., & P. J. Hayes (1969). Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. In B. Meltzer & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine intelligence 4. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

■ McClelland, J. L., D. E. Rumelhart & G. E. Hinton (1986). The appeal of parallel distributed processing. In D. E. Rumelhart, J. L. McClelland & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the mi crostructure of cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 3-40). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.

■ McCorduck, P. (1979). Machines who think. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

■ McLaughlin, T. (1970). Music and communication. London: Faber & Faber.

■ Mednick, S. A. (1962). The associative basis of the creative process. Psychological Review 69, 431-436.

■ Meehl, P. E., & C. J. Golden (1982). Taxometric methods. In Kendall, P. C., & Butcher, J. N. (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in clinical psychology (pp. 127-182). New York: Wiley.

■ Mehler, J., E.C.T. Walker & M. Garrett (Eds.) (1982). Perspectives on mental rep resentation: Experimental and theoretical studies of cognitive processes and ca pacities. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Mill, J. S. (1900). A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive: Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. London: Longmans, Green.

■ Miller, G. A. (1979, June). A very personal history. Talk to the Cognitive Science Workshop, Cambridge, MA.

■ Miller, J. (1983). States of mind. New York: Pantheon Books.

■ Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In P. H. Winston (Ed.), The psychology of computer vision (pp. 211-277). New York: McGrawHill.

■ Minsky, M., & S. Papert (1973). Artificial intelligence. Condon Lectures, Oregon State System of Higher Education, Eugene, Oregon.

■ Minsky, M. L. (1986). The society of mind. New York: Simon & Schuster.

■ Mischel, T. (1976). Psychological explanations and their vicissitudes. In J. K. Cole & W. J. Arnold (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on motivation (Vol. 23). Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press.

■ Morford, M.P.O., & R. J. Lenardon (1995). Classical mythology (5th ed.). New York: Longman.

■ Murdoch, I. (1954). Under the net. New York: Penguin.

■ Nagel, E. (1959). Methodological issues in psychoanalytic theory. In S. Hook (Ed.), Psychoanalysis, scientific method, and philosophy: A symposium. New York: New York University Press.

■ Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal questions. London: Cambridge University Press.

■ Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

■ Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

■ Neisser, U. (1972). Changing conceptions of imagery. In P. W. Sheehan (Ed.), The function and nature of imagery (pp. 233-251). London: Academic Press.

■ Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

■ Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: What are the important questions? In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory (pp. 3-24). London: Academic Press.

■ Neisser, U. (1979). The concept of intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg & D. K. Detterman (Eds.), Human intelligence: Perspectives on its theory and measurement (pp. 179-190). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

■ Nersessian, N. (1992). How do scientists think? Capturing the dynamics of conceptual change in science. In R. N. Giere (Ed.), Cognitive models of science (pp. 3-44). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

■ Newell, A. (1973a). Artificial intelligence and the concept of mind. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 1-60). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

■ Newell, A. (1973b). You can't play 20 questions with nature and win. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing (pp. 283-310). New York: Academic Press.

■ Newell, A., & H. A. Simon (1963). GPS: A program that simulates human thought. In E. A. Feigenbaum & J. Feldman (Eds.), Computers and thought (pp. 279-293). New York & McGraw-Hill.

■ Newell, A., & H. A. Simon (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

■ Nietzsche, F. (1966). Beyond good and evil. W. Kaufmann (Trans.). New York: Vintage. (Originally published in 1885.)

■ Nilsson, N. J. (1971). Problem- solving methods in artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.

■ Nussbaum, M. C. (1978). Aristotle's Princeton University Press. De Motu Anamalium. Princeton, NJ:

■ Oersted, H. C. (1920). Thermo-electricity. In Kirstine Meyer (Ed.), H. C. Oersted, Natuurvidenskabelige Skrifter (Vol. 2). Copenhagen: n.p. (Originally published in 1830 in The Edinburgh encyclopaedia.)

■ Ong, W. J. (1982). Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word. London: Methuen.

■ Onians, R. B. (1954). The origins of European thought. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

■ Osgood, C. E. (1960). Method and theory in experimental psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1953.)

■ Osgood, C. E. (1966). Language universals and psycholinguistics. In J. H. Greenberg (Ed.), Universals of language (2nd ed., pp. 299-322). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Palmer, R. E. (1969). Hermeneutics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

■ Peirce, C. S. (1934). Some consequences of four incapacities-Man, a sign. In C. Hartsborne & P. Weiss (Eds.), Collected papers of Charles Saunders Peirce (Vol. 5, pp. 185-189). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Penfield, W. (1959). In W. Penfield & L. Roberts, Speech and brain mechanisms. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

■ Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the mind: A search for the missing science of conscious ness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

■ Perkins, D. N. (1981). The mind's best work. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Peterfreund, E. (1986). The heuristic approach to psychoanalytic therapy. In

■ J. Reppen (Ed.), Analysts at work, (pp. 127-144). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.

■ Piaget, J. (1952). The origin of intelligence in children. New York: International Universities Press. (Originally published in 1936.)

■ Piaget, J. (1954). Le langage et les opeґrations intellectuelles. Proble` mes de psycho linguistique. Symposium de l'Association de Psychologie Scientifique de Langue Francёaise. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

■ Piaget, J. (1977). Problems of equilibration. In H. E. Gruber & J. J. Voneche (Eds.), The essential Piaget (pp. 838-841). London: Routlege & Kegan Paul. (Originally published in 1975 as L'eґquilibration des structures cognitives [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France].)

■ Piaget, J., & B. Inhelder. (1973). Memory and intelligence. New York: Basic Books.

■ Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct. New York: Morrow.

■ Pinker, S. (1996). Facts about human language relevant to its evolution. In J.-P. Changeux & J. Chavaillon (Eds.), Origins of the human brain. A symposium of the Fyssen foundation (pp. 262-283). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Planck, M. (1949). Scientific autobiography and other papers. F. Gaynor (Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library.

■ Planck, M. (1990). Wissenschaftliche Selbstbiographie. W. Berg (Ed.). Halle, Germany: Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina.

■ Plato (1892). Meno. In The Dialogues of Plato (B. Jowett, Trans.; Vol. 2). New York: Clarendon. (Originally published circa 380 B.C.)

■ Poincareґ, H. (1913). Mathematical creation. In The foundations of science. G. B. Halsted (Trans.). New York: Science Press.

■ Poincareґ, H. (1921). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. G. B. Halstead (Trans.). New York: Science Press.

■ Poincareґ, H. (1929). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. New York: Science Press.

■ Poincareґ, H. (1952). Science and method. F. Maitland (Trans.) New York: Dover.

■ Polya, G. (1945). How to solve it. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

■ Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

■ Popper, K. (1968). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York: Harper & Row/Basic Books.

■ Popper, K., & J. Eccles (1977). The self and its brain. New York: Springer-Verlag.

■ Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.

■ Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Putnam, H. (1987). The faces of realism. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.

■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1981). The imagery debate: Analog media versus tacit knowledge. In N. Block (Ed.), Imagery (pp. 151-206). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Towards a foundation for cog nitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

■ Quillian, M. R. (1968). Semantic memory. In M. Minsky (Ed.), Semantic information processing (pp. 216-260). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Rabbitt, P.M.A., & S. Dornic (Eds.). Attention and performance (Vol. 5). London: Academic Press.

■ Rawlins, G.J.E. (1997). Slaves of the Machine: The quickening of computer technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

■ Reid, T. (1970). An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 151-178). New York: Random House/Modern Library.

■ Reitman, W. (1970). What does it take to remember? In D. A. Norman (Ed.), Models of human memory (pp. 470-510). London: Academic Press.

■ Ricoeur, P. (1974). Structure and hermeneutics. In D. I. Ihde (Ed.), The conﬂict of interpretations: Essays in hermeneutics (pp. 27-61). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

■ Robinson, D. N. (1986). An intellectual history of psychology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

■ Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

■ Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. In N. Warren (Ed.), Studies in cross cultural psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 1-49) London: Academic Press.

■ Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 27-48). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Rosch, E., & B. B. Lloyd (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Rose, S. (1970). The chemistry of life. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

■ Rose, S. (1976). The conscious brain (updated ed.). New York: Random House.

■ Rose, S. (1993). The making of memory: From molecules to mind. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1992)

■ Roszak, T. (1994). The cult of information: A neo- Luddite treatise on high- tech, artificial intelligence, and the true art of thinking (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.

■ Royce, J. R., & W. W. Rozeboom (Eds.) (1972). The psychology of knowing. New York: Gordon & Breach.

■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1977). Introduction to human information processing. New York: Wiley.

■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. Bruce & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Rumelhart, D. E., & J. L. McClelland (1986). On learning the past tenses of English verbs. In J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Rumelhart, D. E., P. Smolensky, J. L. McClelland & G. E. Hinton (1986). Schemata and sequential thought processes in PDP models. In J. L. McClelland, D. E. Rumelhart & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel Distributed Processing (Vol. 2, pp. 7-57). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Russell, B. (1927). An outline of philosophy. London: G. Allen & Unwin.

■ Russell, B. (1961). History of Western philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.

■ Russell, B. (1965). How I write. In Portraits from memory and other essays. London: Allen & Unwin.

■ Russell, B. (1992). In N. Griffin (Ed.), The selected letters of Bertrand Russell (Vol. 1), The private years, 1884- 1914. Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin. Ryecroft, C. (1966). Psychoanalysis observed. London: Constable.

■ Sagan, C. (1978). The dragons of Eden: Speculations on the evolution of human intel ligence. New York: Ballantine Books.

■ Salthouse, T. A. (1992). Expertise as the circumvention of human processing limitations. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Sanford, A. J. (1987). The mind of man: Models of human understanding. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

■ Sapir, E. (1921). Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.

■ Sapir, E. (1964). Culture, language, and personality. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1941.)

■ Sapir, E. (1985). The status of linguistics as a science. In D. G. Mandelbaum (Ed.), Selected writings of Edward Sapir in language, culture and personality (pp. 160166). Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1929).

■ Scardmalia, M., & C. Bereiter (1992). Literate expertise. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Schafer, R. (1954). Psychoanalytic interpretation in Rorschach testing. New York: Grune & Stratten.

■ Schank, R. C. (1973). Identification of conceptualizations underlying natural language. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 187-248). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

■ Schank, R. C. (1976). The role of memory in language processing. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), The structure of human memory. (pp. 162-189) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

■ Schank, R. C. (1986). Explanation patterns: Understanding mechanically and creatively. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Schank, R. C., & R. P. Abelson (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ SchroЁdinger, E. (1951). Science and humanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Searle, J. R. (1981a). Minds, brains, and programs. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 282-306). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Searle, J. R. (1981b). Minds, brains and programs. In D. Hofstadter & D. Dennett (Eds.), The mind's I (pp. 353-373). New York: Basic Books.

■ Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. New York: Cambridge University Press.

■ Serres, M. (1982). The origin of language: Biology, information theory, and thermodynamics. M. Anderson (Trans.). In J. V. Harari & D. F. Bell (Eds.), Hermes: Literature, science, philosophy (pp. 71-83). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

■ Simon, H. A. (1966). Scientific discovery and the psychology of problem solving. In R. G. Colodny (Ed.), Mind and cosmos: Essays in contemporary science and philosophy (pp. 22-40). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

■ Simon, H. A. (1979). Models of thought. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

■ Simon, H. A. (1989). The scientist as a problem solver. In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert Simon. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Simon, H. A., & C. Kaplan (1989). Foundations of cognitive science. In M. Posner (Ed.), Foundations of cognitive science (pp. 1-47). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Simonton, D. K. (1988). Creativity, leadership and chance. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Knopf.

■ Smith, E. E. (1988). Concepts and thought. In J. Sternberg & E. E. Smith (Eds.), The psychology of human thought (pp. 19-49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Smith, E. E. (1990). Thinking: Introduction. In D. N. Osherson & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Thinking. An invitation to cognitive science. (Vol. 3, pp. 1-2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Socrates. (1958). Meno. In E. H. Warmington & P. O. Rouse (Eds.), Great dialogues of Plato W.H.D. Rouse (Trans.). New York: New American Library. (Original publication date unknown.)

■ Solso, R. L. (1974). Theories of retrieval. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Theories in cognitive psychology. Potomac, MD: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Spencer, H. (1896). The principles of psychology. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts.

■ Steiner, G. (1975). After Babel: Aspects of language and translation. New York: Oxford University Press.

■ Sternberg, R. J. (1977). Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

■ Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg, Thinking and problem solving. San Diego: Academic Press.

■ Sternberg, R. J., & J. E. Davidson (1985). Cognitive development in gifted and talented. In F. D. Horowitz & M. O'Brien (Eds.), The gifted and talented (pp. 103-135). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

■ Storr, A. (1993). The dynamics of creation. New York: Ballantine Books. (Originally published in 1972.)

■ Stumpf, S. E. (1994). Philosophy: History and problems (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

■ Sulloway, F. J. (1996). Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives. New York: Random House/Vintage Books.

■ Thorndike, E. L. (1906). Principles of teaching. New York: A. G. Seiler.

■ Thorndike, E. L. (1970). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. Darien, CT: Hafner Publishing Co. (Originally published in 1911.)

■ Titchener, E. B. (1910). A textbook of psychology. New York: Macmillan.

■ Titchener, E. B. (1914). A primer of psychology. New York: Macmillan.

■ Toulmin, S. (1957). The philosophy of science. London: Hutchinson.

■ Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organisation of memory. London: Academic Press.

■ Turing, A. (1946). In B. E. Carpenter & R. W. Doran (Eds.), ACE reports of 1946 and other papers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Turkle, S. (1984). Computers and the second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York: Simon & Schuster.

■ Tyler, S. A. (1978). The said and the unsaid: Mind, meaning, and culture. New York: Academic Press.

■ van Heijenoort (Ed.) (1967). From Frege to Goedel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.

■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

■ Wagman, M. (1991a). Artificial intelligence and human cognition: A theoretical inter comparison of two realms of intellect. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1991b). Cognitive science and concepts of mind: Toward a general theory of human and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1993). Cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence: Theory and re search in cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1995). The sciences of cognition: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1996). Human intellect and cognitive science: Toward a general unified theory of intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1998b). Language and thought in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology, artificial intelligence, and neural science. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1998c). The ultimate objectives of artificial intelligence: Theoretical and research foundations, philosophical and psychological implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wagman, M. (2000). Scientific discovery processes in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.

■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.

■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.

■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.

■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. New York: W. H. Freeman.

■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.

■ Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.

■ Whorf, B. L. (1956). In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Whyte, L. L. (1962). The unconscious before Freud. New York: Anchor Books.

■ Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings. Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin.

■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.

■ Winston, P. H. (1987). Artificial intelligence: A perspective. In E. L. Grimson & R. S. Patil (Eds.), AI in the 1980s and beyond (pp. 1-12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

■ Winston, P. H. (Ed.) (1975). The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.

■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.

■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.

■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).

■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.

■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.

■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.

■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
18 Artificial Intelligence

   1) Programs and the Complexity of Human Mental Processes

   In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Is an Engineering Discipline

   Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)

   3) A Sceptical View of Artificial Intelligence

   Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inﬂated predictions....

   When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)

   4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually

   Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the Program

   Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)

   6) The Meaning of a Symbolic Description

   What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   7) The Principle of Artificial Intelligence

   [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)

   8) Artificial Intelligence Recognizes the Need for Knowledge in Its Systems

   The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)

   9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form

   The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)

    10) There Are Many Types of Reasoning

   There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:

    Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins ﬂy? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can ﬂy, so robins probably can ﬂy."

    Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)

    11) Programs Are Beginning to Do Things That Critics Have Asserted to Be Impossible

   Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)

    12) The Synthesis of Man and Machine

   Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)

    13) The Thesis of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI)

   The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)

    14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation

   It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)

    15) Four Kinds of Artificial Intelligence

   We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.

   ♦ Nonpsychological AI

   Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.

   ♦ Weak Psychological AI

   Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.

   ♦ Strong Psychological AI

... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)

   ♦ Suprapsychological AI

   Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)

    16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts

   Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)

    17) Form and Content Are Not Fundamentally Different

   Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System

   Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence

   The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.

   The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)

    20) Mathematical Logic Provides the Basis for Theory in AI

   The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....

   AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)

    21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions

   In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)

    22) Definitions of Artificial Intelligence

   Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)

    23) The Computer Can Not Be a Model of the Mind

   Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)

    24) Computers Will Not Always Be Inferior to Human Brains

   The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
19 entendimiento

m.

1 understanding.

2 mind, intellect, reasoning power.

* * *

entendimiento

► nombre masculino

1 (comprensión) understanding, comprehension

2 (sentido común) understanding, sense, judgement

3 (inteligencia) intelligence

* * *

noun m.

understanding

* * *

SM

1) (=inteligencia) understanding, mind

el entendimiento humano no tiene límites — human understanding o the human mind has no limits

un hombre de mucho entendimiento — a man of great understanding, a very wise man

¡este chico no tiene entendimiento! — this boy has no brains!

2) (=comprensión) understanding

medidas para fomentar un mejor entendimiento de las leyes — measures to foster a better understanding of the laws

3) (=acuerdo) understanding

llegar a un entendimiento — to reach an understanding

* * *

masculino

1) ( acuerdo) understanding

2) (razón, inteligencia) mind

tiene el entendimiento de un niño — he has the mind o intelligence of a child

todavía no tiene suficiente entendimiento — he's not old enough to understand

* * *

= insight, understanding, rapport.

Ex. The human indexer works mechanically and rapidly; he should require no insight into the document content.

Ex. A basic understanding in the concept of these libraries was the desire to confront the user with shelved books on entering and while moving through the building.

Ex. While such a policy might reduce the library's not always deserved status as an institution of high culture, it would increase rapport between the library and its users and might lead to some real reader stimulation by the library and its personnel.

----

* entendimiento mutuo = mutual understanding.

* error de entendimiento = misunderstanding.

* falta de entendimiento = lack of understanding.

* * *

masculino

1) ( acuerdo) understanding

2) (razón, inteligencia) mind

tiene el entendimiento de un niño — he has the mind o intelligence of a child

todavía no tiene suficiente entendimiento — he's not old enough to understand

* * *

= insight, understanding, rapport.

Ex: The human indexer works mechanically and rapidly; he should require no insight into the document content.

Ex: A basic understanding in the concept of these libraries was the desire to confront the user with shelved books on entering and while moving through the building.

Ex: While such a policy might reduce the library's not always deserved status as an institution of high culture, it would increase rapport between the library and its users and might lead to some real reader stimulation by the library and its personnel.

* entendimiento mutuo = mutual understanding.

* error de entendimiento = misunderstanding.

* falta de entendimiento = lack of understanding.

* * *

entendimiento

masculine

A (armonía, acuerdo) understanding

llegar a un entendimiento to reach an understanding

B (razón, inteligencia) mind

el entendimiento humano no alcanza a comprender esos misterios the human mind cannot fathom those mysteries, those mysteries are beyond the bounds of human understanding

tiene el entendimiento de un niño de cuatro años he has the mind o intelligence of a four-year-old

* * *

entendimiento sustantivo masculino
a) ( acuerdo) understanding

b) ( capacidad para entender) mind;

◊ todavía no tiene suficiente entendimiento he's not old enough to understand

entendimiento sustantivo masculino
1 (inteligencia) understanding
2 (acuerdo) todavía no hay entendimiento entre ellos, there's still a lack of understanding between them
' entendimiento' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
luz
- sintonía
- torpe
- torpeza
- comunicación
- entorpecer
English:
insight
- understanding

* * *

entendimiento nm

1. [acuerdo] understanding;

han llegado a un entendimiento they've reached an understanding

2. [juicio] judgement;
[inteligencia] mind, intellect;
fenómenos que van más allá del entendimiento humano phenomena that are beyond human understanding

3. [comprensión] understanding

* * *

entendimiento

m

1 understanding

2 ( inteligencia) mind

* * *

entendimiento nm

1) : intellect, mind

2) : understanding, agreement

Spanish-English dictionary > entendimiento
20 Philosophy

   1) There Are Ideas That Have Their Own True and Immutable Nature

   And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)

   2) Examine What Is within Our Reach

   Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)

   3) Modern Philosophy Starts with the Cartesian Catastrophe

   As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)

   4) The Rightful Claims of Philosophy

   It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the inﬂuence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic inﬂuences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)

   5) The Philosophy of Philosophy

   Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)

   6) Philosophy Is a Field Which Has Certain Central Questions

   I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)

   7) The Central Task of Philosophy

   What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.

   This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).

   The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....

   Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)

   8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science

   In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)

   9) The Enduring Value of Philosophy

   Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....

   Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)

    10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- Control

   In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

Страницы

См. также в других словарях:

Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind — The Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind is a work by the French philosopher and mathematician Marquis de Condorcet, written in 1794 while in prison during the French Revolution and published posthumously. External… … Wikipedia
The Adapted Mind — The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture is an edited volume, first published in 1992 by Oxford University Press, edited by Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. It is widely considered the foundational text… … Wikipedia
The Educated Mind — How Cognitive Tools Shape Our Understanding is a 1997 book on educational theory by Kieran Egan. Main arguments Criticism of previous education theories Egan argues that the whole of educational theorizing pivots around three basic ideas of what … Wikipedia
The Captive Mind — is a 1953 book by Polish writer and academic Czeslaw Milosz, written immediately after the author received political asylum in Paris after his break with Poland s Communist government. The book attempted to explain both the intellectual allure of … Wikipedia
The Human Instinct — were a New Zealand blues rock band active from the late 1960s until the early 1980s. The band s commercial peak was from 1969 to 1971, when albums featured the Jimi Hendrix inspired guitar work of Billy Tekahika, professionally known as Billy… … Wikipedia
The Closing of the American Mind — Author(s) Allan Bloom Country … Wikipedia
The Human Expression — Infobox musical artist | Name = The Human Expression Img capt = Img size = Background = group or band Alias = Origin = Los Angeles, California Genre = Garage rock, psychedelic rock Years active = 1966 1967 Label = Accent Records Associated acts … Wikipedia
The Lost Mind of Dr. Brain — Infobox VG |title = The Timewarp of Dr. Brain developer = Sierra Entertainment publisher = designer = engine = version = released = July 14, 1994 genre = Educational, Puzzle modes = Single player platforms = Macintosh, Windows, Windows 3.x media … Wikipedia
The Human Equation — Infobox Album | Name = The Human Equation Type = studio Artist = Ayreon Released = May 25, 2004 Recorded = 2004 Genre = Progressive metal Length = 1:42:14 Label = InsideOut Music Producer = Arjen Lucassen Reviews = PiercingMetal Rating 10|9 [http … Wikipedia
The Human Factor (1963 The Outer Limits) — Infobox Television episode Title = The Human Factor Series = The Outer Limits Caption = Season = 1 Episode = 8 Airdate = November 11, 1963 Production = 3 Writer = David Duncan Director = Abner Biberman Photographer = Conrad Hall Guests = Gary… … Wikipedia
The Art of Fiction — The Art of Fiction: A Guide for Writers and Readers is a nonfiction book by Ayn Rand, published posthumously. Edited by Tore Boeckmann, it was published by Plume in 2000, ISBN 0452281547. The book is based on a 1958 series of 12 four hour… … Wikipedia

Словари и энциклопедии на Академике

Перевод: со всех языков на все языки

the human mind

См. также в других словарях:

Поделиться ссылкой на выделенное

Словари и энциклопедии на Академике

Перевод: со всех языков на все языки

the human mind

См. также в других словарях:

Поделиться ссылкой на выделенное

Прямая ссылка: